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One puzzle in high worry and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is the heterogeneity in
the level of autonomic arousal symptoms seen among affected individuals. While current
models agree that worry persists, in part, because it fosters avoidance of unpleasant
internal experiences, they disagree as to whether worry does so by suppressing
activation of autonomic arousal or by fostering persistent autonomic hyperarousal.
Our Cognitive Control Model predicts that which pattern of autonomic arousal occurs
depends on whether or not a worrier has sufficient cognitive control capacity to worry
primarily in a verbal versus imagery-based manner. Because this model has been
supported by only one study to date, the present study sought to replicate and extend
that study’s findings. Results from an online survey in an unselected sample of over 900
college students provide further support for our model’s central tenet and initial support
for its prediction that higher effortful control is associated with a higher percentage of
verbal thought during worry. Finally, we report tentative evidence that autonomic arousal
symptoms in worry and GAD vary as a function of individual differences in cognitive
control capacity because higher capacity is linked to a greater predominance of verbal
thought during worry.
Keywords: worry, generalized anxiety disorder, autonomic arousal, verbal worry, cognitive avoidance, effortful
control, cognitive control capacity
INTRODUCTION
Excessive and uncontrollable worry is a common form of perseverative cognition that, at its
most severe levels is the hallmark of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). Until recently, such worry was seen as being characterized by low levels of
autonomic arousal, a pattern predicted by the Cognitive Avoidance (CognAv) Model of worry
(Borkovec et al., 2004). That model posits, in part, that worry is characterized by suppression of
fear-provoking images and the autonomic arousal they would typically engender, by shifting to a
verbal mode of threat processing. This model is supported by numerous studies finding that worry
and GAD are indeed characterized by a lack of elevated autonomic arousal. However, despite such
support, a similarly large body of studies shows instead that worry and GAD are characterized by
high levels of autonomic arousal. In light of such findings, another model of GAD, the Contrast
Avoidance (ContrAv) Model (Newman and Llera, 2011), posits that worry does not serve to limit
activation of autonomic arousal but rather to increase and maintain heightened autonomic arousal
and negative emotionality more broadly, which permits worriers to avoid unpredictable spikes
in such emotional states, which they find aversive. However, whereas the CognAv model cannot
account for findings that worry and GAD are characterized by high levels of autonomic arousal,
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neither can the ContrAv model easily accommodate the opposite
pattern. To resolve this conflict, Vasey et al. (2016) recently
proposed and tested an integrative model, which posits that
only when worriers have sufficient cognitive control capacity
to suppress intrusive threatening imagery and shift instead to
verbal processing of threat can they avoid the autonomic arousal
that such images would otherwise elicit. Absent such capacity,
worry will instead be characterized by heightened autonomic
arousal. In the initial study, the pattern of results was consistent
with this prediction, in both a large, unselected sample and
in an analog GAD subsample. Using another sample of over
900 individuals, the current study sought to replicate and
extend these findings to show why cognitive control capacity
matters.
Prior to the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994)
autonomic arousal symptoms were among the defining features
of GAD. Specifically, in the DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric
Association, 1987), GAD was defined by unrealistic and excessive
worry accompanied by at least 6 of 18 symptoms from three
clusters, including autonomic hyperactivity (e.g., shortness of
breath, accelerated heart rate). However, with the introduction
of DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), autonomic
arousal symptoms were dropped and remain absent in the DSM-5
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). This decision was
based on the CognAv model and on findings that GAD patients
infrequently endorsed these symptoms (e.g., Marten et al., 1993).
There is, in fact, striking heterogeneity in the level of
autonomic arousal in worriers and GAD samples (see Vasey
et al., 2016 for a review). This is true whether autonomic
arousal is measured subjectively (e.g., Marten et al., 1993; Brown
and McNiff, 2009) or objectively using heart rate (HR; e.g.,
Lyonfields et al., 1995; Thayer et al., 1996), non-specific skin
conductance responses (NS-SCRs; Andor et al., 2008; Pruneti
et al., 2010), and salivary alpha amylase (sAA; Fisher et al.,
2010; Fisher and Newman, 2013). There is also evidence of
heterogeneity in autonomic arousal in response to emotional
provocation whether using threat stimuli (e.g., Grillon, 2008;
Pruneti et al., 2010) or worry inductions (e.g., Andor et al.,
2008; Llera and Newman, 2014). Neuroimaging studies also
reveal such heterogeneity. GAD samples either show significantly
less than or do not differ from controls in amygdala activation
in response to threat stimuli, while others show significantly
higher activation (e.g., Monk et al., 2006, 2008). As a whole, it
appears that pathological worry is at times characterized by low
levels of autonomic arousal that are not significantly different
from levels displayed by healthy controls, and at other times
characterized by high levels of autonomic arousal which are
not significantly different from that of individuals with panic
disorder.
Importantly, several studies have found that worry may
blunt autonomic arousal in response to fear-provoking imagery
(e.g., Borkovec and Hu, 1990; Borkovec et al., 1993). To the
contrary, others have found that a worry period did not suppress
autonomic arousal in response to fearful imagery in absolute
terms (e.g., Peasley-Miklus and Vrana, 2000; Llera and Newman,
2014). Rather, worry significantly increased HR from baseline,
which prevented further increases in HR during presentation of
fearful stimuli.
To account for the well-documented heterogeneity in level of
autonomic arousal among worriers and individuals with GAD,
Vasey et al. (2016) proposed an integrative model. They predicted
and found that individual differences in effortful control, a
broad self-regulatory construct which encompasses attentional,
inhibitory, and activation control (Rothbart, 2007), accounts for
this heterogeneity. Specifically, they found that effortful control
was negatively associated with autonomic arousal symptoms.
Importantly, that negative association was strongest at the highest
levels of worry and GAD symptom severity.
Even though worry is generally seen as being associated
with deficits in cognitive control resources such as attentional
control (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2011; Hirsch and Mathews, 2012),
worriers and those with GAD nevertheless vary considerably
in their capacity to control their attention. As reviewed in
Vasey et al. (2016), worriers and individuals with GAD vary in
effortful control and related constructs when measured using
self-report (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2011; Rosellini and Brown,
2011), behavioral measures (e.g., Derryberry and Reed, 2002;
Olatunji et al., 2011), neuroimaging (e.g., Etkin et al., 2009; Price
et al., 2011), and a physiological index of capacity for top–down
control (i.e., resting heart rate variability [HRV; see Thayer et al.,
2009 for a review; Brosschot et al., 2007; Aldao et al., 2012]).
Such individual differences in effortful control among worriers
and GAD samples are especially important given that there
appears to be a negative relationship between executive function
and autonomic arousal symptoms (Beaudreau and O’Hara, 2009;
Etkin et al., 2009; Richey et al., 2012). For example, in addition
to finding an atypical pattern of functional connectivity between
the amygdala and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) in
GAD patients, Etkin et al. (2009) found that the strength of that
connectivity was significantly negatively associated with scores on
the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck and Steer, 1990), which
is predominantly a measure of autonomic arousal symptoms
(Leyfer et al., 2006). Consequently, they concluded that at least
some GAD patients exhibit habitual engagement of an executive
control system to regulate autonomic arousal symptoms.
However, the demonstration that effortful control moderates
the association between worry/GAD symptom severity and
autonomic arousal does not elucidate the mechanism by which
it does so. Vasey et al. (2016) proposed that a closer examination
of the CognAv model reveals a mechanism by which individual
differences in cognitive control capacity can impact the level of
autonomic arousal triggered by worry. As stated by Borkovec
et al. (2004, p. 83), “...when aversive images occur in the process
of worry...the shifting of attention to [verbal] worrisome thinking
upon each occurrence...results in escape from or avoidance of
the somatic element of the fear response...,” suggesting that
heterogeneity in autonomic arousal symptoms may depend on
the extent to which verbal or imaginal processing predominates
during worry.
The proposed mechanism of the CognAv model is supported
by several points. First, visual images rather than verbal thoughts
of feared stimuli are more likely to activate autonomic arousal
responses (e.g., Tucker and Newman, 1981; Vrana et al., 1986).
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Additionally, studies have found that people spontaneously shift
from imagery to verbalization to reduce autonomic arousal
when processing aversive material (Tucker and Newman, 1981;
Borkovec et al., 1998). Moreover, verbal thoughts predominate
over imagery during worry (Borkovec and Lyonfields, 1993),
especially in GAD patients (Hirsch and Mathews, 2012). Indeed,
worry is characterized by a predominance of left-frontal cortical
activity (e.g., Wu et al., 1991; Hofmann et al., 2005), which
has been linked to verbal thought (Tucker, 1981; Pinker, 1994).
Additionally, sustaining a verbal linguistic mode of worry is
more taxing on working memory resources than worrying in an
imaginal form (Leigh and Hirsch, 2011), suggesting that high
effortful control capacity may be instrumental in maintaining
a predominantly verbal form of worry. Nevertheless, despite
the evidence that verbal processing predominates over imagery
during worry, others have found otherwise (e.g., Borkovec
et al., 1993; Stapinski et al., 2010). Furthermore, it appears that
differences in the extent to which verbal worry predominates
can account for differences in autonomic arousal (Borkovec
et al., 1993). For example, Borkovec et al. (1993) found
that percentage of verbal worry reported by participants was
significantly negatively correlated with HR response whereas in
the relaxation condition, percentage of imagery was significantly
positively correlated with HR response. Thus, it appears that
the presence of autonomic arousal symptoms depends on the
extent to which verbal or imaginal processing predominates
during worry, which in turn depends on the worrier’s cognitive
capacity to emphasize the former mode of processing over the
latter.
The current study was an attempt to replicate Vasey et al.’s
(2016) findings about the role of cognitive control capacity
(specifically effortful control) in the heterogeneity of autonomic
arousal symptoms in worry and GAD, especially when worry
is pathological. Second, the current study extended prior work
by testing the second major aspect of the model. No previous
study has tested our model’s prediction that individual differences
in effortful control capacity moderate the association between
worry/GAD symptoms and the extent to which worry involves
verbal thought. Specifically, the current study employed self-
report questionnaires in an unselected sample to test the
following predictions:
(1) Effortful control will moderate the positive association
between worry/GAD symptoms and autonomic arousal
symptoms, such that it is strongest when effortful control
is low and weakest when effortful control is high.
(a) In an analog GAD subsample, effortful control
will be significantly negatively correlated with
autonomic arousal.
(2) Effortful control will moderate the association between
worry/GAD symptoms and candidate mediators, including
(a) verbal thoughts during worry, (b) imagery during worry,
and (c) efforts to transform images into thoughts, such that
higher effortful control will predict more verbal thoughts
and efforts to transform images into thoughts and less
imagery during worry.
(3) If effortful control emerges as a significant moderator
of the association between worry/GAD symptom severity
and any of the candidate mediators, we expect that
moderated mediation (Hayes, 2013) will be observed, such
that the indirect path from worry/GAD symptoms to
autonomic arousal symptoms through the mediator will
vary significantly as a function of effortful control.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and Procedure
The sample comprised 990 undergraduates at a large Midwestern
university (mean age = 18.8 [SD = 1.4]; 54.4% female, 80%
White, 4% African American, 9% Asian, 3% Latino/Latina, 1%
Native American, and 4% mixed ethnic heritage) who received
partial course credit for participation. Participants received a
broad description about a 30-min online set of questionnaires
related to worry and psychological adjustment. Participants were
informed that they were free to decline to participate, stop at
any point during the questionnaire, or decline to answer any
question without penalty. De-identified responses were collected
using Surveymonkey, a secure, web-based data collection service.
Measures
The Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire IV
(GADQ-IV)
The Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire IV (GADQ-IV)
(Newman et al., 2002) is a self-report questionnaire designed
as a screening measure that captures the full diagnostic criteria
for GAD according to the DSM-IV. The GADQ-IV has good
test–retest reliability, convergent and discriminant validity, and
good agreement with diagnostic interviews (Newman et al., 2002;
Moore et al., 2014). We used the GADQ-IV as a measure of
GAD symptom severity and scored it without the skip structure
as reported in Vasey et al. (2016) and as recommended by
Rodebaugh et al. (2008). As shown in Table 1, the internal
consistency of the GADQ-IV was high in the present study.
Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire (WAQ)
The Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire (WAQ) (Dugas et al.,
2001) consists of 11 items covering DSM-IV diagnostic criteria
for GAD. The WAQ has satisfactory test–retest reliability and
good known-groups validity (Dugas et al., 2001). As shown in
Table 1, the internal consistency of the WAQ was high in the
present study.
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ)
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) (Meyer et al.,
1990) is a self-report measure of pathological worry, which
comprises 16 items rated on a Likert scale ranging from 1
(Not at all typical) to 5 (Very typical). This scale has excellent
psychometric properties (Meyer et al., 1990). As shown in
Table 1, the internal consistency of the PSWQ was high in the
present study.
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics.
Full sample N = 926 GAD sample (12.9%) N = 120
Cronbach’s alpha M SD M SD
GADQ-IV 0.85 5.5 3.2 10.7 0.75
WAQ 0.92 36.8 17.2 58.7 11.9
PSWQ 0.93 49.9 13.6 67.1 10.0
DASS-Anxiety 0.87 6.6 6.2 26.9 6.9
DASS-Depression 0.93 7.9 8.1 30.3 9.9
DASS-Stress 0.92 11.6 8.2 35.7 8.1
EC 0.82 45.3 6.8 42.2 7.2
CAQ-Transform 0.84 12.2 4.5 14.6 4.4
Percentage of thoughts – 64.3 26.5 70.8 19.2
Percentage of images – 25.7 19.7 25.4 16.7
GADQ-IV, Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-IV; WAQ, Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire; PSWQ, Penn State Worry Questionnaire; DASS, Depression, Anxiety,
and Stress Scale; EC, Effortful Control Scale; CAQ-Transform, Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire – Transformation of Images into Thoughts subscale.
The Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales (DASS)
The Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales (DASS) (Lovibond
and Lovibond, 1995) is a 42 items questionnaire comprising three
14 item subscales measuring symptoms of anxiety (DASS-A),
stress and depression. Participants rate each item on a four-point
Likert scale ranging from 0 (Did not apply to me at all) to 3
(Applied to me very much, or most of the time) regarding how
much the item applied to them over the past week. The current
study focused on the DASS-A, which predominantly measures
autonomic arousal symptoms (Brown et al., 1998). The DASS-
A has good psychometric properties (Lovibond and Lovibond,
1995) and, as shown in Table 1, its internal consistency was high
in the current sample.
Effortful Control Scale (ECS)
The Effortful Control Scale (ECS) (Lonigan and Phillips, 1998,
Unpublished) comprises 24 items rated on a five-point scale
from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much) with regard to how much
each describes the individual most of the time. The ECS yields
two subscale scores reflecting Persistence/Low Distractibility
(ECS-PLD; 12 items) and Impulsivity (ECS-I; 12 items). In
this study we focused on the ECS-PLD subscale, which focuses
on attention control and the capacity to persist in activities
despite reactive motivation to avoid. Example items from this
subscale include, “It’s very hard for me to concentrate on a
difficult task when there are noises around (R)” and “I can
quickly switch from one task to another.” The measure has
good psychometric properties in college samples (Vasey, 2014,
Unpublished) and, as shown in Table 1, it had high internal
consistency in the current study. In an independent unselected
college sample of over 700 subjects, the ECS-PLD subscale
correlated strongly with the Adult Temperament Questionnaire
EC Scale (r = 0.61, p < 0.0001). ECS-PLD scores also
behave in the expected fashion in other contexts. For example,
Vasey et al. (2014) used the ECS-PLD subscale to demonstrate
that individual differences in self-regulatory capacity moderate
the associations of negative and positive emotionality with
depressive symptoms. The ECS-PLD subscale is hereinafter
labeled EC.
Percentage of Thoughts and Images
These constructs were assessed with two open-ended
questions. This self-report method was used successfully
to assess the percentage of thoughts and images during
worry in a large unselected sample (Freeston et al., 1996),
and the findings were consistent with percentages found in
thought sampling studies (e.g., Borkovec and Inz, 1990).
To ensure that participants understood the question, they
were first given an explanation of imagery versus verbal
thought: “Images are when you are generating a picture in
your mind and really concentrating on what you can see,
feel, smell, hear, and taste in the image. Images are often
very vivid because you’re tuning into all of your senses.
Verbal thoughts are when you’re thinking using words
and silently talking to yourself, like an internal running
commentary or dialog. When you’re thinking in verbal
thoughts you are thinking in words and sentences” (Leigh
and Hirsch, 2011). Participants were then asked to report
the percentage of time spent in thoughts and images during
worry. The questions about images and thoughts were as
follows: “What percentage of your worry is made up of
thoughts?” and “What percentage of your worry is made up of
images?”
Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire (CAQ)
The Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire (CAQ) (Gosselin
et al., 2002) contains 25 items assessing efforts to use
cognitive avoidance strategies such as thought replacement,
thought suppression, and distraction. This scale has been
validated and translated into English (Sexton and Dugas,
2008). The CAQ has very good test–retest reliability over
4 weeks, r = 0.81, and shows evidence of convergent
validity and criterion-related validity (Gosselin et al., 2002).
In the current study, we used the Transformation of Images
into Verbal Thought subscale (CAQ-Transform), which
measures efforts to transform images into thoughts. This
subscale has a good psychometric properties and, as shown
in Table 1, it had good internal consistency in the current
sample.
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Data Analytic Strategy
Study hypotheses were tested through multiple linear regression
(MLR) analyses. All non-dichotomous predictors were mean-
centered by z-transformation in these analyses (Aiken and
West, 1991). All product terms used in these analyses to test
interactions were computed from the standardized predictor
variables. Additionally, all dependent variables (i.e., DASS-A
and CAQ-transform) except those with readily interpretable
scales (i.e., percentage of thoughts and images) were also
standardized. Regression diagnostics were examined for each
model to determine if extreme data points were present that
might be exerting excessive influence on overall model fit or on
individual regression coefficients. Specifically, for each model we
examined the standardized DFFITS and DFBETA values using
±1.0 as a cutoff (Cohen et al., 2002). No high influence cases were
identified in any analysis.
Significant interactions were probed using PROCESS, a
computational tool for SPSS (Hayes, 2013)1. Specifically,
PROCESS utilizes the Johnson–Neyman technique for deriving
regions of significance, which identify the range of values of
the moderator where the simple slope of the predictor is
significant (Preacher et al., 2007). In this manner we reported the
regions of significance and illustrated interactions by depicting
the predictors’ effect on the dependent variable at high (90th
percentile) and low (10th percentile) levels of the moderator.
Because we were primarily interested in those with high
worry/GAD symptom severity, we also tested EC’s effect on the
dependent variable at high (90th percentile) levels of worry/GAD
symptom severity.
Statistical power to detect an interaction is a function of
the variability in the product term representing that interaction
(McClelland and Judd, 1993). Because the WAQ measures
GAD symptoms using a Likert scale rather than the mostly
dichotomous items on the GADQ-IV, we expected that the
product term representing its interaction with EC would
have more variability than the product terms involving the
GADQ-IV. For that reason, we chose it as our primary
predictor. Ancillary tests based on the GADQ-IV and PSWQ
are reported in the Supplementary Material. Consistent with this
rationale, the standard deviation for the WAQ × EC interaction
(SD = 1.09) was descriptively larger than that of the GADQ-IV
or PSWQ× EC interaction (SD= 1.06 and 1.02, respectively).
Finally, we examined EC as a moderator for the indirect path
between worry/GAD symptom severity and autonomic arousal
symptoms for any candidate mediator that was significantly
predicted by the worry/GAD symptom × EC interaction.
Specifically, PROCESS (Model 8) was used to conduct tests of
moderated mediation as depicted in Figure 1. A bootstrapping
approach was used in these tests as recommended by Preacher
et al. (2007) because it avoids the assumption of normally
distributed products of the coefficients. Specifically, using
PROCESS, we conducted bootstrapped (5000 resamples) tests of
each mediator at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles
of the moderator. Furthermore, because we were most interested
in individuals with high levels of worry/GAD symptoms, we also
1http://www.afhayes.com
FIGURE 1 | Conceptual model for tests of moderated mediation.
examined EC’s indirect effect on autonomic arousal symptoms
via the mediator at high (90th percentile) levels of worry/GAD
symptom severity. These tests should be interpreted with caution
due to the cross-sectional nature of the current study. Recent
simulation studies show that cross-sectional tests of mediation
can produce biased estimates of the indirect effect (e.g., Maxwell
et al., 2011). However, like Hayes and Rockwood (2016), we
believe that such tests can still be useful in theory testing.
In the present case, we believe such a test is a reasonable,
albeit tentative, initial test of the plausibility of our model.
At any given point in time, high trait worriers will engage in
more verbal thought during worry when they have high versus
low levels of trait effortful control. To the extent that they
do so, such high effortful control worriers should show less
activation of autonomic arousal than those lower in effortful
control.
Additionally, to determine if our model holds even at very
high levels of worry/GAD symptom severity, we also tested
our first hypothesis in an analog GAD sample. That is, among
individuals with high levels of GAD symptom severity, EC should
be significantly negatively correlated with autonomic arousal.
In this context it is important to note that the viability of our
model does not require that the GAD Symptom Severity × EC
interaction be significant in such a subsample. Although we
found that interaction to be significant in the analog GAD
subsample in our original study (Vasey et al., 2016), we have since
realized that result was surprising. That reflects the fact that as
one constrains the range of GAD symptom severity, one reduces
variance in the product term representing the GAD Symptom
Severity × EC interaction. That, in turn, reduces statistical
power to find an effect of the interaction (see McClelland and
Judd, 1993). To be clear, that reduction in power is above and
beyond any reduction in power associated with the smaller
sample size of the analog GAD subsample. In essence, as one
constrains the range of GAD symptom severity to very high
levels, the interaction term becomes redundant with the EC
main effect because it ceases to vary much beyond the variance
in EC because the range of GAD symptom severity has been
severely restricted. Instead, at high levels of GAD symptom
severity, our model is most powerfully evaluated in terms of the
magnitude and significance of the EC main effect (controlling
for remaining variance in GAD symptom severity). Provided
that main effect is significantly negative, our model would be
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supported. With that in mind we tested EC’s effect predicting
DASS-A scores while controlling for WAQ scores in our analog
GAD group.
There are several approaches for identifying those likely to
meet criteria for GAD on the GADQ-IV (Moore et al., 2014).
In the current study, the analog GAD subsample included all
participants who met DSM-IV criteria based on the GADQ-IV.2
Our only additional requirement was that their score on the
GADQ-IV ≥ 9, a cutoff found by Newman et al. (2002) to
yield 97% specificity and a false positive rate of only 4% in a
similar college sample. That approach yielded a group of 120
cases (72.5% female). As shown in Table 1, this approach resulted
in an analog GAD group characterized by very high levels of
worry and GAD symptoms. Specifically, this group had a mean
score of 67.09 (SD = 9.96) on the PSWQ, higher than the mean
for analog GAD samples (i.e., 63.58) and comparable to clinical
GAD samples (i.e., 67.16) as reported by Startup and Erickson
(2006).
Second, we also tested our first hypothesis using an analog
GAD group drawn from a large sample created by combining
the current sample with the sample from the Vasey et al.
(2016) study. From the resulting group of 2249 cases we chose
a subsample of cases based on the GADQ-IV score3 (scored
following the original scoring approach of Newman et al.,
2002). Specifically, we identified the GADQ-IV score defining
approximately the top 5% of cases.4 A cutoff GADQ-IV score
of 11.0 identified 5.3% of cases (N = 119; n = 73 [5.5%]
2Applying the criteria used in Vasey et al. (2016) identified only 55 subjects.
However, those criteria (i.e., meeting DSM-IV criteria for GAD based on the
GADQ-IV and scoring 70 or higher on the PSWQ) were unusually very stringent
and the resulting group was considerably more extreme on the PSWQ (M = 75.5
[SD = 3.1]) than typical analog GAD samples (M = 63.58 [SD = 10.8]) or even
clinically diagnosed samples (M = 67.16 [SD = 9.2]; see Startup and Erickson,
2006).
3Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-IV scores were used as a measure of
GAD symptom severity because the initial sample did not complete the WAQ.
4This subsample overlaps with the analog sample in the current study. Specifically,
the 46 subjects in the combined sample which were drawn from the current sample
were all members of the analog sample drawn from the current sample (i.e., they
comprised the most severe 38.3% of that analog sample).
from Vasey et al. (2016) and n = 46 [5.0%] from the current
sample). All but two members of this group (i.e., 98.3%) met
DSM-IV criteria based on the GADQ-IV. They had a mean
score of 69.08 (SD = 9.05) on the PSWQ – a value which is
significantly above the average PSWQ score across studies of
analog GAD samples (p < 0.001) and comparable to clinical
GAD samples (see Startup and Erickson, 2006). Additionally,
their mean score on the GADQ-IV was 11.52 (SD = 0.48).
That value is significantly higher than in our previous analog
GAD sample (p < 0.001) and roughly comparable to most
other analog GAD samples (e.g., Fisher et al., 2010; Fisher
and Newman, 2013). Finally, PSWQ, WAQ, GADQ-IV, EC,
and DASS-A scores did not differ significantly by sample
(ps > 0.12), suggesting that both subsamples were comparable in
severity.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Data from 926 of 990 participants are reported (93.5% of
the original sample, 55% female). Data from the other 64
participants were excluded because they exhibited suspicious
patterns of responding (i.e., excessive missing data [>50% of all
questionnaires], nonsensical values, repeat entries, or a repetitive
pattern of responding). For the remaining 926 participants,
incomplete items and missing data were handled using a two-
step process. First, for participants with incomplete data who
had less than 50% missing items within a questionnaire, their
individual means were used to compute their total score.
Individual mean substitution when internal consistency of a
questionnaire is strong does not produce substantial bias and
is more desirable than discarding individuals from the dataset
(Osbourne, 2013). Next, the expectation-maximization (EM)
method was used to impute missing values for single-item
questions as well as total scores for questionnaires (participants
missing more than 50% of items within the questionnaires;
9 cases [1.0%] had 1 missing scale score, 7 cases [0.8%] had
2 missing scale scores, and 2 [0.2%] had 3 missing scale
TABLE 2 | Zero-order correlations.
Sex GADQ- IV WAQ PSWQ DASS-A DASS-D DASS-S EC % Thoughts % Images
GADQ-IV 0.27∗∗∗
WAQ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗
PSWQ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
DASS-Anxiety 0.03 0.54∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
DASS-Depression 0.02 0.53∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
DASS-Stress 0.15∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
EC 0.02 −0.32∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗
% Thoughts 0.10∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.02 0.09∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ −0.02
% Images −0.04 0.03 0.03 −0.03 0.08∗ 0.03 0.03 −0.04 −0.41∗∗∗
CAQ-Transform 0.06† 0.27∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.05 0.16∗∗∗
N = 926. ∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; †p < 0.10. GADQ-IV, Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-IV; WAQ, Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire; PSWQ, Penn
State Worry Questionnaire; DASS, Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale; EC, Effortful Control Scale; CAQ-Transform, Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire – Transformation
of Images into Thoughts subscale.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 March 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 108
fnhum-11-00108 March 9, 2017 Time: 20:11 # 7
Toh and Vasey Cognitive Control Model of Worry
scores). Data were missing completely at random (Little’s MCAR
test: p = 0.353) and the group with missing values did not
differ significantly from the group with complete data on any
variable5.
Descriptive Statistics
Means, standard deviations (SD), and internal consistency
reliabilities for all measures (i.e., Cronbach’s coefficient alpha)
are presented in Table 1. Zero-order correlations are presented
in Table 2. Several correlations were particularly noteworthy.
As expected, GADQ-IV, WAQ, and PSWQ scores were
significantly negatively associated with EC scores but only
moderately so (r = −0.32, −0.38, and −0.24, respectively).
Next, EC scores were significantly negatively associated with
DASS-A scores (r = −0.44). Finally, as expected, GADQ-
IV, WAQ, and PSWQ scores were significantly positively
associated with percentage of thoughts (r = 0.15, 0.16, and 0.17
respectively).
Did Effortful Control Interact with GAD
Symptom Severity to Predict Autonomic
Arousal?6
Table 3 shows that on average DASS-A scores were significantly
positively predicted by the WAQ and significantly negatively
predicted by EC. The WAQ× EC interaction was also significant.
WAQ scores significantly positively predicted DASS-A scores
across all levels of EC. However, that association was stronger
when EC was low (B = 0.57, p < 0.001) versus high
(B = 0.38, p < 0.001; see Figure 2). From the reverse
perspective, EC scores significantly negatively predicted DASS-
A scores when the WAQ score was high (B = −0.35,
p< 0.001).
Was Effortful Control Negatively
Correlated with Autonomic Arousal in
the Analog GAD Groups?
Current Sample
Consistent with expectation, results showed that after controlling
for WAQ scores, the EC main effect was significantly negative
(semi-partial r =−0.23, p= 0.008) in the analog GAD group.
Combined Sample
In the analog GAD group from the combined sample, results
showed after controlling for GADQ-IV score, the EC main
effect was significantly negative (semi-partial r = −0.31,
p < 0.001). Furthermore, this association was not significantly
moderated by sample (p = 0.69). Thus, EC behaved in
similar fashion at high levels of GAD symptoms in both
samples.
5All analyses were ran without the 18 cases with one or more missing scale scores.
All significant results remained significant.
6See the online supplement for a test of the PSWQ × EC and GADQ-IV × EC
interaction predicting DASS-A scores. The interaction was significant in both
cases.
Did Effortful Control Interact with GAD
Symptom Severity to Predict Percentage
of Thoughts?7
Table 4 shows on average that percentage of thoughts
was significantly positively predicted by the WAQ but
not significantly negatively predicted by EC. However,
the WAQ × EC interaction was also significant. WAQ
scores significantly positively predicted percentage of
thoughts when EC > −0.126 SD. Thus, that association
was significant when EC was high (B = 6.73, p < 0.001)
versus low (B = 2.51, p = 0.081; see Figure 3). From the
reverse perspective, EC significantly positively predicted
percentage of thoughts when the WAQ was high (B = 3.18,
p< 0.019).
Did Effortful Control Interact with GAD
Symptom Severity to Predict Percentage
of Imagery?8
As shown in Table 3, there were no significant effects of WAQ,
EC, or their interaction predicting percentage of imagery during
worry.
Did Effortful Control Interact with GAD
Symptom Severity to Predict Efforts to
Transform Images into Thoughts?9
As Table 3 shows, on average CAQ-transform scores were
significantly positively predicted by WAQ (B = 0.27, p < 0.001)
and significantly negatively predicted by EC (B = −0.16,
p< 0.001). However, the WAQ× EC interaction did not achieve
significance (B= 0.04, p= 0.143).
Did Percentage of Verbal Thoughts
Mediate the Association between GAD
Symptom Severity and Autonomic
Arousal Conditional upon Level of
Effortful Control?10,11
Given that EC moderated the link between the WAQ and
percentage of thoughts, we also examined whether this effect was
related to autonomic arousal symptoms. Specifically, we used
a moderated mediation model to test whether the relationship
between WAQ and DASS-A was mediated by percentage of
thoughts but conditional upon level of EC. Based on the MLR
7See the online supplement for a test of the PSWQ × EC and GADQ-IV × EC
interaction predicting percentage of thoughts during worry. The interactions were
not significant and marginally significant respectively.
8See the online supplement for a test of the PSWQ × EC and GADQ-IV × EC
interaction predicting percentage of imagery during worry. The interactions were
significant and not significant respectively.
9See the online supplement for a test of the PSWQ × EC and GADQ-IV × EC
interaction predicting efforts to transform imagery into thoughts. The interactions
were not significant.
10See the online supplement for a test of the indirect effect of GADQ-IV × EC
interaction predicting DASS-A scores through percentage of thoughts during
worry. The interaction was not significant but was in the direction expected.
11Only a test of the indirect effect of percentage of thoughts was done because the
other two candidate mediators were unrelated to the interaction.
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TABLE 3 | Regression model testing WAQ × EC predicting DASS-Anxiety, percentage of imagery, and CAQ-transform.
DV:DASS-A DV:% Imagery DV:CAQ-transform
Step/variable R2/B 1R2/SE sr R2/B 1R2/SE sr R2/B 1R2/SE sr
Step 1 0.383∗∗∗ − 0.002 − 0.130∗∗∗ −
Step 2 0.389∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.003 0.001 0.132 0.002
Intercept −0.01 0.03 25.69∗∗∗ 0.65 0.01 0.03
WAQ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.03 0.44∗∗∗ 0.37 0.70 0.02 0.27∗∗∗ 0.03 0.25∗∗∗
EC −0.26∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.23∗∗∗ −0.73 0.70 −0.03 −0.16∗∗∗ 0.03 0.14∗∗∗
WAQ × EC −0.07∗∗ 0.02 −0.08∗∗ 0.58 0.60 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05
N = 926. ∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01. WAQ, Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire; DASS-A, Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale – Anxiety subscale; EC, Effortful Control
Scale; CAQ-Transform, Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire –Transformation of Images into Thoughts subscale.
FIGURE 2 | Graph of the WAQ × EC interaction predicting DASS-A at the 10th and 90th percentile of WAQ and EC.
model shown in Table 5, results supported significant moderated
mediation predicting DASS-A (index of moderated mediation
[Hayes, 2015]12 = −0.0038; SE = 0.0028; lower limit of CI
[LLCI] = −0.0117; upper limit of CI [ULCI] = −0.0001), with
the effect being significantly stronger at high versus low levels
of EC. As shown in Table 5, the pattern was as expected,
such that at high EC, WAQ predicted a higher percentage of
thoughts, which in turn predicted lower DASS-A scores. As
predicted, that indirect path weakened at lower levels of EC.
Importantly, as reported in Table 5 and as expected, viewed
from the reverse perspective, when WAQ was high (i.e., 90th
percentile), there was a negative indirect effect of EC on
DASS-A by virtue of its association with higher percentage of
thought13.
12The index of moderated mediation is an estimate of the slope of the line relating
the indirect effect to the moderator (Hayes, 2015). If this index is statistically
different from zero, there is significant moderated mediation.
13We also tested an alternate model in which autonomic arousal interacted with
effortful control to predict level of worry and percentage of verbal thoughts. The
DASS-A × EC interaction was significant and produced a pattern consistent with
expectation.
DISCUSSION
This study extended work on the Cognitive Control Model
of pathological worry in two significant ways. First, it offers
additional evidence by providing a replication of Vasey et al.’s
(2016) findings that cognitive control capacity acts as a moderator
to explain the heterogeneity in level of autonomic arousal
associated with worry and GAD, especially in the pathological
worry range. As expected, the current results provide support for
this integrated model in self-reported data from an unselected
sample as well as in two overlapping analog GAD subsamples.
Specifically, in the current unselected sample we found that
individual differences in effortful control moderated the link
between worry/GAD symptom severity and autonomic arousal
symptoms such that this link is strongest when effortful control
was low and weakest when effortful control was high. That
analysis also showed that the effortful control was most strongly
negatively correlated with autonomic arousal symptoms among
those highest in GAD symptoms (i.e., those at or above the 90th
percentile). Furthermore, results from both analog subsamples
lend confidence to the conclusion that this negative association
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TABLE 4 | Moderated mediation results involving WAQ × EC predicting
DASS-A through percentage of thoughts.
Predictor: WAQ
Step/variable R2/B SE sr
DV: Percentage of thoughts 0.0317∗∗∗
Intercept 64.30 0.86
WAQ 4.71∗∗∗ 0.93 0.16∗∗∗
EC 1.21 0.93 0.04
WAQ × EC 1.58∗ 0.79 0.07∗
DV: DASS-A 0.393∗∗∗
Intercept 0.13† 0.07
Percentage of thoughts −0.002∗ 0.001 −0.06∗
WAQ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.03 0.44∗∗∗
EC −0.25∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.24∗∗∗
WAQ × EC −0.07∗∗ 0.02 −0.07∗∗
N= 926. ∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; †p < 0.10. WAQ, Worry and Anxiety
Questionnaire; DASS-A, Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale – Anxiety subscale;
EC, Effortful Control Scale.
between effortful control and autonomic arousal occurs even at
very high levels of GAD symptoms.
The strongest evidence for this comes from a subsample of
the most severe worriers (i.e., the top 5.3% of scorers on the
GADQ-IV) from over 2200 members of a sample combining the
current sample with that from our original study (Vasey et al.,
2016). Even in that analog GAD subsample EC was significantly
negatively correlated with autonomic arousal symptoms (semi-
partial r = −0.31), which bolsters confidence that such estimates
of the effect (i.e., simple slope) of EC at high levels of GAD
symptoms from large unselected samples are likely to generalize
to those with pathological levels of worry and GAD symptoms.
The second goal of this study was to extend our previous
findings by testing the second major aspect of the Cognitive
Control Model. Specifically, no previous study has tested
the model’s prediction that individual differences in effortful
control capacity moderate the association between worry/GAD
symptoms and the extent to which worry involves verbal
thought. Consistent with that prediction, individual differences
in effortful control interacted significantly with GAD symptom
severity to predict percentage of verbal thoughts during
worry. Most importantly, effortful control was significantly
negatively associated with percentage of verbal thoughts when
GAD symptoms were high. Although the variance accounted
for by this regression model was small, it is important to
remember that the dependent variable was a single, retrospective
questionnaire item. As such, its reliability is undoubtedly
limited.
Finally, the moderated mediation analysis further offers
tentative support for the plausibility of our model. Specifically,
GAD symptom severity predicted higher percentage of thoughts
during worry which in turn predicted lower autonomic arousal
symptoms when effortful control was high versus low. This
effect is perhaps clearer when viewed from the perspective of
the indirect effect of effortful control on autonomic arousal
symptoms at high (i.e., 90th percentile) GAD symptoms.
Specifically, the indirect effect was significantly negative, by way
of effortful control’s positive association with verbal thought
percentage, which in turn was negatively associated with
autonomic arousal. This is consistent with our model’s view that
worry predicts lower autonomic arousal at high levels of effortful
control because effortful control permits greater success in
emphasizing verbal thought during worry. Nevertheless, we must
emphasize the tentative nature of this support since all variables
in the moderated mediation model were collected concurrently
(Maxwell et al., 2011). Although our results are consistent with
predictions of our model, prospective study designs, preferably
with experimental manipulation of effortful control resources, are
needed to support strong confidence in this aspect of our model.
FIGURE 3 | Graph of the WAQ × EC interaction predicting percentage of thoughts at the 10th and 90th percentile of WAQ and EC.
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TABLE 5 | Bootstrapped estimates of the conditional indirect paths for the effect of WAQ and EC on DASS-A through percentage of thoughts.
Indirect effect Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI
Indirect effects of WAQ at varying levels of EC
10th −0.0061 0.0046 −0.0185 −0.0002
25th −0.0089 0.0047 −0.0209 −0.0017
50th −0.0117 0.0056 −0.0248 −0.0025
75th −0.0140 0.0067 −0.0297 −0.0030
90th −0.0162 0.0080 −0.0360 −0.0035
Indirect effect of EC at 90th percentile of WAQ −0.0077 0.004 −0.0195 −0.0011
N = 926. Bootstrapped estimates are based on 5,000 samples. Significant effects appear in bold. LLCI, lower limit of confident interval; ULCI, upper limit of confident
interval. WAQ, Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire; EC, Effortful Control Scale.
Taken together with results from Vasey et al. (2016),
the current findings suggest that there are pathological
worriers and GAD patients who have the cognitive control
capacity required to maintain a verbal mode of processing
necessary, which is required to access negative reinforcement
contingencies stemming from limiting activation of autonomic
arousal. On the other hand, those who lack such capacity
tend to experience fewer verbal thoughts during worry and
consequently higher autonomic arousal as a consequence
of worry. Such a pattern fits with the prerequisites
for the negative reinforcement stemming from contrast
avoidance.
We expected to find that the association between GAD
symptom severity and percentage of images during worry was
strongest when effortful control is low. However, the fact
that we did not is perhaps not surprising given that another
study using the same single item retrospective questionnaire
failed to find it to be significantly associated with GAD
symptoms. Specifically, another self-report study found no
significant differences between GAD analogs and normal
controls in the percentage of images reported during worry
(Freeston et al., 1996). Furthermore, a laboratory study also
found that controls and GAD patients did not differ in
percentage of imagery during a worry period (Borkovec and
Inz, 1990). Consistent with past findings, our study found
that worry is predominantly verbal (65% verbal versus 25%
imagery). Because of this low average percentage of imagery,
it may be that statistical power to find effects is limited by
range restriction. Future studies using mentation sampling
during worry and relaxation periods may yield a more
sensitive measure of variation in percentage of imagery during
worry.
Also contrary to expectation, the interaction between
worry/GAD symptom severity and effortful control was
unrelated to self-reports of efforts to transform images into
thoughts. One reason could be that accurate self-report of
this construct rests on an untested assumption that this
construct is consciously accessible to individuals (Sexton and
Dugas, 2008). Furthermore, in validating the CAQ, Gosselin
et al. (2002) reported that three of the five items from the
CAQ-Transform scale loaded more highly on a different factor,
suggesting that this construct is complex. As such, use of tasks
such as mentation sampling may increase validity in future
studies.
To this point we have focused on effortful control as
a stable trait-like construct and its association to inter-
individual differences in the level of autonomic arousal symptoms
experienced during worry. However, effortful control capacity
can vary within an individual (e.g., due to varying levels of
cognitive load or stress). Given that, our integrative model thus
also suggests the potential for intra-individual differences in
autonomic arousal symptoms as a function of variations in a
worrier’s ability to emphasize verbal worry. There are at least
two possible paths to such differences. First, evidence suggests
that constraining worry to such verbal modes of processing
depletes cognitive resources (Leigh and Hirsch, 2011), which
can lead to increased negative intrusions (Stokes and Hirsch,
2010) and promote further attention to threat (Williams et al.,
2014). This suggests that worrying in a verbal manner may
deplete the very resources needed to maintain such a verbal
mode of processing. If so, even worriers and those with
GAD who have high trait-level capacity for effortful control
may experience increasing autonomic arousal symptoms during
prolonged periods of worry, as their ability to suppress images
and shift to a verbal mode of processing wanes. Second, during
periods of other cognitive load or stress, such individuals may
experience heightened autonomic arousal symptoms during
bouts of worry because their capacity for effortful control
and ability to constrain worry to a verbal mode has been
depleted (Steinhauser et al., 2007). Furthermore, such heightened
arousal may lead to an upward spiral in worry and autonomic
arousal symptoms because perceptions of arousal appear to
maintain worry among those high in GAD symptoms. An
experimental study found that when asked to relax following
a worry induction, GAD patients who were given false arousal
feedback maintained their levels of worrying while those who
were given false relaxation feedback decreased their levels of
worrying (Andor et al., 2008). This suggests that during periods
of prolonged stress worriers for whom worry usually functions
to limit autonomic arousal symptoms may instead experience
increased vulnerability to intrusive images and autonomic
arousal symptoms as a result of stress-related effortful control
resource depletion. Unfortunately, a test of this hypothesis awaits
future research.
Limitations
This study’s results should be considered in the context
of several limitations. Although significant, it should be
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noted that the magnitude of variance accounted for by the
interaction between GAD symptom severity and effortful control
predicting autonomic arousal and, especially, percentage of
thought during worry was small. However, in this regard it
is important to recall that power to detect interactions is
highest and such interactions will be strongest in samples
that include many individuals who fall at the confluence
of the extremes of the interacting dimensions in question
(McClelland and Judd, 1993). In this case, it is most important
for a sample to include as many individuals with high GAD
symptom severity combined with either high or low effortful
control. Because the current study utilized an unselected
sample, in which most individuals inevitably fell toward the
middle of the bivariate distribution defined by the interacting
variables, the interaction term cannot account for much
variance in the sample as a whole. Future studies should
seek to oversample for such individuals to maximize statistical
power to detect the interaction effect (McClelland and Judd,
1993).
With regard to the small amount of variance accounted for in
predicting percentage of thoughts during worry, it is important
to recall that the dependent variable was derived from a single-
item measure. Single-item measures have been shown to have
much poorer reliability than multi-item measures (Nunnally
and Bernstein, 1994). Nevertheless, we thought such measures
offered a reasonable starting point since they have been used
successfully in other self-report studies using unselected samples
especially for reports of thoughts during worry (e.g., Borkovec
and Lyonfields, 1993; Freeston et al., 1996). Furthermore, that
the single-item measure (i.e., percentage of thoughts) revealed the
expected effect may be cause for optimism about the robustness
of the effect. However, to increase the likelihood of replication
of these findings, future studies should utilize more reliable and
valid measures (e.g., thought sampling [Borkovec and Inz, 1990;
Hirsch et al., 2012]).
This study was also limited because we did not obtain
diagnostic information and cannot be sure how many members
of our analog GAD group actually met DSM criteria for
GAD. That said, we believe research on such samples is still
useful, especially given that studies have shown that worry is
continuously distributed in the population and that there are
no clear boundaries between subclinical and clinical levels of
worry and GAD symptoms (Ruscio et al., 2001; Olatunji et al.,
2010). Moreover, our analog GAD group’s average PSWQ score
(M = 67.09, SD = 9.96) is comparable to those reported for
either analog GAD samples (M = 63.6, SD = 10.8) or clinical
GAD samples (M = 67.2, SD = 9.2; Startup and Erickson, 2006).
Nevertheless, replication in clinical GAD samples is needed
to increase confidence that this model applies to a clinical
population.
A further limitation was our exclusive reliance on self-reports.
Future studies are needed to replicate these findings with
objective measures of autonomic arousal and effortful control.
However, with regard to such measures of autonomic arousal
it is important to note that our model does not require that
subjective and objective measures be concordant. In other words,
the reinforcement mechanisms in the CognAv and ContrAv
models should both operate even if they only involve subjective
autonomic arousal. For example, in the case of the CognAv
model, the negative reinforcement mechanism associated with
a verbal mode of worrying would operate even if it were
only linked to reductions in subjective experience of autonomic
arousal. Similarly, it should be sufficient for the ContrAv
Model if worry is linked to high levels of subjective arousal.
Nevertheless, many of the studies of verbal versus imaginal
processing of threat on which the CognAv Model is based
used objective measures. Therefore, we certainly expect that
our model can also account for heterogeneity in objective
measures. Indeed, we recently completed an initial test of
that hypothesis and found the self-reported GAD symptom
severity (using the GADQ-IV) and effortful control (using
the Adult Temperament Questionnaire – Effortful Control
scale; Evans and Rothbart, 2007) interacted significantly in
predicting mean HR during a baseline period (Free, 2017,
Unpublished). Second, that study replaced self-reported effortful
control with a measure of resting HRV, which provides
a physiological measure of top–down control capacity (see
e.g., Thayer et al., 2012). Results showed that like self-
reports of effortful control, HRV significantly moderated the
association between GAD symptom severity and autonomic
arousal symptoms.
Future Directions
In sum, this study’s findings provided a replication of the
results reported by Vasey et al. (2016), showing that the
Cognitive Control Model can account for the well-documented
heterogeneity in level of autonomic arousal symptoms in worry
and GAD. Furthermore, they serve to increase confidence that
the model’s hypothesized effect of individual differences in
cognitive control capacity on autonomic arousal does indeed
occur even at very high levels of worry and GAD symptoms.
Furthermore, the current findings extend prior work by offering
initial support for the proposed mechanism of this model.
Specifically, the percentage of verbal thoughts during worry
varies as a function of level of effortful control capacity such
that it is highest among worriers with high capacity for effortful
control. Furthermore, it appears that the positive correlation
between effortful control and verbal worry involves the same
variance as the negative correlation between effortful control and
autonomic arousal symptoms. Our test of moderated mediation
thus supports, albeit preliminarily, the plausibility of our model’s
prediction regarding the interplay between cognitive control
capacity, predominance of verbal thought during worry, and
autonomic arousal. Thus, the Cognitive Control Model can
potentially reconcile the CognAv and the ContrAv models by
showing how worry can serve either of the two models’ avoidant
functions for worriers depending on their cognitive control
capacity. In short, a worrier with high cognitive control capacity
should have greater success in making and maintaining the shift
to a verbal mode of threat processing posited by the CognAv
Model, thereby limiting activation of autonomic arousal. In
contrast, a worrier low in such capacity should have difficulty
doing so, resulting in heightened autonomic arousal, thereby
fostering avoidance of aversive contrasts due to unpredictable
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spikes in emotional arousal as postulated by the ContrAv
Model. Thus, our findings have implications for better
understanding the avoidant functions of worry in the etiology
and maintenance of GAD. Although promising, however,
a replication of these findings using multiple measures of
worry, effortful control, and autonomic arousal at more
comprehensive levels of analysis is needed to further foster
confidence in our model. Specifically, future studies using a
worry induction and monitoring the process of worry in real
time (as opposed to retrospective self-report) would be an
important advance. Similarly, use of EEG during relaxation
and worry periods may yield objective measures of differing
patterns of activation during verbal versus imagery-based
worry. While subjective and objective autonomic arousal
need not show concordance for our model to function as
expected, because heterogeneity in the level of autonomic
arousal is seen among worriers it is important for future work
to evaluate the model in the context of psychophysiological
measures of autonomic arousal. Finally, these findings should
be replicated using behavioral measures of effortful control.
These include behavioral measures (e.g., the Attention
Network Test [ANT]) and physiological measures (e.g.,
resting HRV).
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